Abstract-We introduce the multiple enrollment scheme for SRAM-physical unclonable functions (PUFs). During each enrollment, the binary power-on values of the SRAM are observed, and a corresponding key and helper data are generated. Each key can later be reconstructed from an additional observation and the helper data. The helper data do not reveal information about the keys to an attacker. It is our goal to use the additional enrollments to consecutively increase the entropy of the generated key material. We analyze two alternative settings. First, we present a regular setting, where each additional key is independent of all previous keys. Second, we introduce a keyreplacement setting, where instead of an additional independent key, a new key (of increased length) is generated that replaces the old key. We characterize the capacity regions for both the settings. We show that the total achievable secret-key rate is equal to the mutual information between all enrollment observations and a single (reconstruction) observation. We derive our results based on a statistical model for the SRAM-PUF that has been proposed in the literature. This model implies a permutation symmetry property of the SRAM-PUF which plays a key role in our proofs.
Secret-Key Capacity Regions for Multiple
Enrollments With an SRAM-PUF agreement scheme presented in [8] and [9] . Here, we refer to this as a single-enrollment scheme, see Figure 1 . The single-enrollment scheme considers two phases. An enrollment phase, where an encoder generates a secret key s based on a first observation x 1 of the PUF. Then, in the reconstruction phase, a decoder reconstructs the key s based on a second (noisy) observation x 2 of the same PUF. During enrollment, besides the key, also a helper data m is generated that will help the decoder to reconstruct the correct key. This helper data is publicly communicated to the decoder, and therefore it should not reveal any information about the key to an attacker. Usually, enrollment is only performed once, while reconstruction can be repeated many times. Furthermore, it is known that the maximum achievable secret-key rate (secretkey capacity) for such a system is equal to the mutual information between the observation on the encoder side and the observation on the decoder side. Clearly, we can increase the mutual information, and thus the secret-key capacity, by considering multiple observations on the encoder side and/or the decoder side. This has inspired us to define a new scenario, that we call the multiple enrollment scheme.
In the multiple enrollment scheme, multiple keys are generated based on multiple observations of an SRAM-PUF, see Figure 3 and 4. We assume that each key and corresponding helper data are generated consecutively based on a next observation of the SRAM-PUF. Furthermore, the encoders require no information about previous observations or previously generated keys. At any time, reconstruction of the current keys can be performed by a decoder based on another SRAM-PUF observation and the previously generated helper data. As the helper data are sent to the decoders over a public channel, the helper data should not reveal any information about the keys to an attacker. We present two variants of the multiple enrollment scheme and derive the corresponding secret-key capacity regions.
Our results show that codes exist for which the key rate increases after each consecutive enrollment. Therefore, such codes improve upon the existing helper-data algorithms. Moreover, our multiple enrollment codes can be used when the same device should be enrolled in multiple systems. Finally, we use a statistical model of SRAM-PUF [10] to calculate the multiple enrollment key rates that could be achieved in practice.
A. Related Work
Helper-data algorithms were first introduced for generating keys from noisy biometrics measurements in [11] and [12] . In [5] a similar algorithm was presented for deriving cryptographic keys from SRAM-PUF observation vectors. The achievable performance of helper-data algorithms under various conditions is analyzed in [13] . Finally, the achievable performance of secret-key generation schemes based on biometric sources is analyzed from information theoretic perspective in [14] and [15] .
The challenge of multiple enrollment was first studied for fuzzy extractors in [16] . Boyen showed that the regular fuzzy extractor scheme is not secure in general when the scheme is re-used on multiple observations of the same biometric source. In [17] and [18] it was shown that when the density of the oneprobabilities of the SRAM-PUF is symmetric, both the fuzzy commitment scheme and the syndrome method remain secure in the case of repeated enrollments. This result was further extended to the temperature dependent SRAM-PUF model for the unbiased case in [19] . In [20] , de-biasing techniques were proposed that ensure security of the helper-data scheme after multiple enrollments for biased SRAM. Note that in all these works multiple enrollment was considered as repeating the same enrollment procedure multiple times. Therefore, these scenarios are different from the work presented in this paper, where in each enrollment a different encoding method may be used.
Lai et al. [21] analyze a multiple use case scenario for the secret-key agreement schemes. They assume that the same biometric observation is reused in multiple systems, and derive the achievable privacy-security trade-off, both for a scenario where the systems are jointly designed, and for a scenario with an incremental design. The secret-keys in both subsystems are independent and uniform. Note that in [21] the total achievable rate does not increase with the number of enrollments, but stays constant instead.
Recent work that considers multiple observations at the encoder and/or the decoder side to improve the performance of the secret-key agreement system, can be found in [22] . Günlü and Kramer evaluate the performance by deriving the corresponding key-leakage-storage region as a function of the number of observations. However, in contrast to our work, they only generate a single key and helper data.
To our best knowledge, increasing the secret-key capacity using multiple enrollments is only investigated in [23] and [24] . In [23] , we presented the 2-enrollment scheme and found the secret-key capacity using linear codes. In [24] , we presented a forgetful setting and derived the corresponding secret-key capacity for any number of enrollments.
In the current work, we extend our previous results for the 2-enrollment scheme [23] , to a t-enrollment scheme, with any number t of enrollments. Furthermore, we introduce the key-replacement setting and derive its capacity region.
The key-replacement setting is closely related to the forgetful setting that was presented in [24] . However, in the forgetful setting the previous keys were considered forgotten and thus security of previously generated keys was not required. In the key-replacement setting the previously generated keys are replaced, but still remain secure from any attacker. This is a stronger requirement than before, and it results in a different proof. Interestingly, despite the stronger requirement, the capacity region for the key-replacement setting is the same as for the forgetful setting [24] .
B. Contributions and Outline
Our main contribution here, is presenting the capacity region for the multiple enrollment scheme for any number of enrollments. We present two alternative versions of the multiple enrollment scheme: the regular setting where each additional key is independent of the previous keys, and a key-replacement setting where each additional key can have increased rate but need not be independent of previously generated keys. For our analysis we introduce a simplified representation of the SRAM-PUF model.
In Section II, we give a short introduction to SRAM-PUFs, present a statistical model, and introduce notation and definitions that are used in the rest of the paper. As a reference and starting point, we present the single enrollment scenario in Section III and give the corresponding secret-key capacity. In the Sections IV-IX, we present two multiple enrollment scenario's, and derive the corresponding capacity regions. Finally, we discuss our results and implications for practical applications in Section X. We conclude with a summary of the presented work in Section XI.
II. NOTATION AND SRAM-PUF STATISTICAL MODEL
An SRAM memory can be used to temporarily store variables during computation. When the power of the memory is turned off, the stored values are lost. After the power is turned back on, a random binary value occurs in each memory cell that we call the power-on value of the SRAM cell.
Small uncontrollable variations in the production process result in variations in the physical properties and thus a slightly different behavior of each SRAM cell. For example, some cells have a very high probability that a one is observed after power-on, while other cells may have a very high probability that a zero is observed. As these variations between the cells cannot be controlled, this results in a random, unpredictable, distribution of zeros and ones across all memory cells. The power-on values of all cells of an SRAM together form a binary pattern that is unique for each SRAM. Therefore, this binary pattern is considered as a digital fingerprint and can be used for authentication [5] , [6] . We use the power-on values of SRAM to generate secret keys.
In the following sections we first introduce the notation that is used in the paper. Then, we present a statistical model for the power-on values of an SRAM-PUF that is based on [10] and [25] , and derive a property of SRAM-PUF that we call the permutation symmetry. 
A. Notation and Definitions
We use lowercase letters to denote constants and realizations of random variables. We observe t binary power-on values of n SRAM cells. The i th observation of the j th SRAM cell is represented by x i j ∈ {0, 1}. When the cell-index j is not relevant, we refer instead to x i as the i th observation of any cell. We use a bold symbol x i = (x i1 , x i2 , . . . , x in ), to represent the i th observation of all n SRAM cells. We call x i the i th observation vector of the SRAM, and it is always a binary vector of length n. After t observations of the SRAM-PUF, we have a sequence of observation vectors (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ). Calligraphic letters are used for finite sets and |I| denotes the cardinality of the set I.
We use uppercase letters to denote random variables. Let (X 1 , . . . , X t ) be a tuple of t random variables and I ⊆ [1 : t] . The subtuple of random variables with indices from I is denoted by X (I) = (X i : i ∈ I). Similarly, for random vectors (X 1 , . . . , X t ), we have that X(I) = (X i : i ∈ I).
In this paper (conditional) entropy and mutual information are defined for binary random variables as in [26] and [27] , and the unit is bit. Furthermore, we define jointly (weakly) typical sets A (n) (X 1 X 2 . . . X i ) as in [26] .
B. SRAM-PUF Statistical Model
We observe the power-on values of an array of n SRAM cells t times, and store the values in a sequence of binary observation vectors (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ), with x i the i th observation vector. We model each cell with a hidden state variable θ j ∈ [0, 1] that defines the probability that a one is observed as the power-on value of that cell. That is, the probability that a one is observed at time i in cell j is Pr(X i j = 1| j = θ j ) = θ j . In our model, the state variables of the cells are assumed to be independent and identically distributed over the cells with distribution p (θ ), and the values are unknown to an observer. We have visualized the SRAM-PUF observations model in Figure 2 . Our statistical model for the observation vectors corresponds to the model that was derived for SRAM-PUF in [10] and [25] . It was shown [10] , [25] that this model closely matches the statistics of experimental data. Note that we do not take the temperature into consideration. We assume that either the temperature of the observations is unknown, or all observations happen at the same temperature.
We are now interested in the probability distribution of the sequence of observation vectors (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ). First, we derive the probability distribution for a single cell.
The t observations of the j th cell correspond to the j th column of the matrix in Figure 2 , and we use col j as a short notation. Now the probability of observing the binary sequence col j in cell j , is
with w H (col j ) the Hamming weight of the observed sequence (the number of observed ones). Note that the probability only depends on the number of ones and zeros that have been observed in col j , not on the order of these observations. Therefore, any permutation of the observations of the j th SRAM cell has the same probability, e.g.
and we call this property the permutation symmetry of SRAM-PUF.
Since the hidden state variables are all independent and identically distributed over the SRAM cells, the observations of the different cells (represented by the columns in Figure 2 ) are independent and identically distributed. Therefore the probability distribution of the observation vectors is
As before, the probability distribution does not depend on the order of observations, but only on the number of observed ones and zeros. Therefore the permutation symmetry property holds not only for multiple observations of a single cell, but also for multiple observations of the group of cells, the observation vectors. Now, we can derive the following properties for the joint entropy and the typical set, respectively, In the presented schemes, besides the t observation vectors that are used for enrollment by the encoders, an additional observation vector is required for the reconstruction of the key(s) by the decoders. For the sake of clarity of the derivations, we represent all encoder observation vectors by the symbol x t +1 . We note that (t + 1) could actually be replaced by any time index, due to the permutation symmetry of SRAM-PUF. Furthermore, the observation vectors that are observed by the different decoders could all have different time-indexes.
III. SINGLE ENROLLMENT
We start by discussing the single enrollment scheme in Figure 1 . First, an encoder constructs a secret key s and helper data m after observing an observation vector x 1 . Then, a decoder observing another vector x 2 , which is a noisy version of x 1 , uses the helper data m to reconstruct an estimate s of the original key. The helper data m should reveal sufficient information to the decoder such that reconstruction of the key is correct with high probability. We assume that the helper data m is public, and therefore the helper data should not reveal any information about the key s to an attacker. An attacker cannot observe any observation vector x i , and tries to obtain information about the key s from the public helper data m.
An (|S|, |M|, n) code for the single enrollment scheme, consists of
• A set of key values S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|} and a set of helper data values M = {1, 2, . . . , |M|}.
• An encoding function E : {0, 1} n → S ×M that assigns a secret s and helper data m to each observation vector x 1 .
an estimate s ∈ S to each received pair (x 2 , m) of an observation vector and helper data. We are interested in the achievable secret-key rate for the single enrollment scheme for SRAM-PUFs, where the achievable secret-key rate is defined as follows.
Definition 1: A secret-key rate R is called achievable in the single enrollment setting, if for all δ > 0 and for all n large enough, there exist encoders and decoders such that
The secret-key capacity C 1 for the single enrollment setting is the maximum achievable secret-key rate.
Theorem 1: A secret-key rate R is achievable in the 1-enrollment setting if and only if
The secret-key capacity is equal to
The single enrollment setting is the same as the secretkey generation scenario studied by Ahlswede and Csiszár [8] and Maurer [9] . A proof of achievability and the converse of Theorem 1 can be found e.g. in [28] and [29] . There, a random coding argument was used to show that codes exist that can achieve the secret-key capacity C.
In the following, we introduce a new scenario where, where instead of only a single enrollment, multiple enrollments are performed by the encoder. We derive the secret-key capacity region for this setting using techniques that are inspired by [28] and [29] .
IV. MULTIPLE ENROLLMENTS
In the multiple enrollments setting, shown in Figure 3 , t consecutive enrollments are performed. During the first enrollment, encoder E 1 observes an observation vector x 1 
. , m i ).
The helper data (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m t ) are considered public, and therefore they should not reveal any information about the keys to an attacker, who cannot observe any of the observation vectors. All secret keys must be uniformly distributed and independent of each other.
An 
The first inequality represents the condition of reliability, the second inequality represents the condition of uniformity and independence of the keys, the third inequality represents the leakage requirement. Finally, the last inequalities make a connection between the key-alphabet size and achievable rates. Note that the second inequality implies independence of the keys, since
Theorem 2: The secret-key capacity region C (t ) of the t-enrollment setting is the set of all rate tuples
. . . . . .
The secret-key capacity
, and the sum-capacity C t sum = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X t ; X t +1 ). In the next Sections, we first prove that all rate tuples that are inside the secret-key capacity region C (t ) are achievable. Furthermore, we prove the converse of Theorem 2, that is, no rate tuples are achievable that are outside of the capacityregion C (t ) .
V. ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove that for any tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R t ) inside the secret-key capacity region C (t ) of Theorem 2, codes exist such that all requirements in Definition 2 are satisfied. In our proof we make use of a random coding argument. Key in our proof is the virtual decoder, which can reconstruct all original observation vectors from all generated secrets and corresponding helper data.
We use (2
. . , 2 n R s t , 2 n R m t , n)-codes for the t enrollments scheme as defined in Section IV. Here we have defined code rates R s i = 1 n log 2 |S i | and R m i = 1 n log 2 |M i | for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, that relate respectively the size of the key alphabet and the size of the helper-data alphabet to the length of the observation vectors.
The t sets of labelings that define the encoding functions (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E t ), are generated uniformly at random. Now, the first encoder maps an observation vector x 1 to a secret key s 1 and helper data m 1 , according to the first encoding function E 1 . Similarly, the i th encoder maps the observation vector x i to a secret key s i and helper data m i , according to the i th encoding function E i .
We define t regular decoders and one virtual decoder. The regular decoders reconstruct secret keys from the received helper data and one observation of the SRAM values. The virtual decoder reconstructs all observation vectors (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) that were observed during enrollment, using the helper data and secrets that were produced by the encoders. Note that the virtual decoder will not be implemented in practice. Instead, we use the fact that a virtual decoder can exist later in the proof, when we show that the secrets are uniform and that there is no leakage. In the following two subsections we describe the decoders in more detail.
A. Regular Decoders
The i th decoder observes an observation vector x t +1 and all previous helper data (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i ). Then he uses joint-typicality decoding to reconstruct the enrolled observation vectors (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i ) and the corresponding secret (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s i ). This is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs.
The first decoder D 1 can reconstruct s 1 when only one helper data m 1 is available. The decoder finds the unique x 1 (and the corresponding key s 1 ), such that E 1 (
Clearly, when decoding is successful and x 1 = x 1 , the secret is also correctly reconstructed. When no unique solution x 1 is found, the decoding fails and the decoder declares an error.
The second decoder D 2 has access to two helper data (m 1 , m 2 ) and can reconstruct both corresponding keys (s 1 , s 2 ), using a two-step algorithm. First, it uses the same strategy as D 1 to reconstruct x 1 and s 1 . Then, it finds the unique x 2 (and the corresponding key s 2 ), such that E 2 (
). Note that we use x 2 that has been reconstructed in the first step. When no unique solution is found, decoding fails and the decoder declares an error.
Similarly, each additional decoder D i can reconstruct observation vector x i and corresponding secret key s i by sequentially decoding all previous observation vectors (and keys), starting by the first observation vector x 1 . For each subsequent decoding it uses the corresponding helper data, the observation vector x t +1 , and all previously decoded observation vectors and applies joint typicality decoding. It decodes
When no unique solution is found, decoding fails and the decoder declares an error. When the decoder has successfully decoded the observation vector x i , the corresponding secret s i follows automatically.
Instead of analyzing the probability of error, we notice that the problem of reconstructing x i from (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i ) and x t +1 corresponds to distributed lossless source coding with a helper. Therefore, it follows from Slepian-Wolf Theorem [30] , [31] (see [27, Th. 10.4] ) that the average error probability for the i th decoder can be made negligibly small, when the helper-data rates satisfy
We meet all requirements by setting (R m 1 , R m 2 , . . . , R m t ) such that
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}. We define P er as the probability, averaged over all possible uniformly generated encoding functions (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E t ), that any of the regular decoders fails. We conclude that P er → 0, for rate tuples that satisfy (1) and for n large enough. Note that (1) is also the optimal solution that meets the Slepian-Wolf requirements for all the regular decoders. This should become clear when we write all the requirements for the first two decoders. For the first decoder (i = 1), only one inequality needs to be satisfied:
It immediately follows that
is optimal. Then, for the second decoder(i = 2), three inequalities have to be satisfied:
The first requirement is already satisfied by our previous choice for R m 1 . Then, it follows that
satisfies both the second and third requirement and therefore it is optimal. The same procedure can be repeated for the following decoders.
B. Virtual Decoder
In addition to the regular decoders we specify a virtual decoder. The virtual decoder reconstructs the observation vector tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) from all helper data (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m t ) and secret keys (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ) . Note that virtual decoding is not actually taking place during key reconstruction. We will use existence of a virtual decoder in the final part of the proof, where we guarantee zero-leakage and uniformity of the secrets. The virtual decoder finds the unique tuple (
If such a unique tuple is not found an error is declared. We notice that the current coding problem corresponds to distributed lossless source coding, and it follows from Slepian-Wolf Theorem (see [27, Th. 10.3] ) that the average error probability of the virtual decoder can be made negligibly small, when the rates satisfy, Therefore, we select all rate tuples (R s 1 , R s 2 , . .
. , R s t ) such that
In the following, we prove that all tuples that satisfy (1), (2), and (3), also satisfy the Slepian-Wolf requirements for the virtual decoder. First of all, for any subset I ⊆ [1 : t] of the rates, with maximum index k (that is k = max{i : i ∈ I}), we find
where (a) follows from the fact that R m 1 ≥ R m 2 · · · ≥ R m t , and (b) and (c) follow from the permutation symmetry of the SRAM-PUF. Secondly,
Finally, it follows from (4) and (5), that
where the last equality follows from the permutation symmetry of the SRAM-PUF. This concludes the proof that the selected rates meet the Slepian-Wolf requirements. It follows that the average error probability of the virtual decoder can be made negligibly small for the selected rates. We define P ev as the probability, averaged over all possible uniformly generated encoding functions (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E t ), that the virtual decoder fails. We conclude that P ev → 0, for rate tuples that satisfy (1)-(3), and for n large enough.
C. Code Existence
Finally, let us define P e as the probability, averaged over all possible uniformly generated encoding functions (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E t ) , that any of the decoders, regular or virtual, fails. Then, by the union bound, P e ≤ P er + P ev . We conclude that P e → 0 for all rate tuples that satisfy (1)-(3) and for n large enough. Therefore, a code exists that achieves these rates, and that has a total error probability P e that is negligibly small.
D. Zero-Leakage and Uniformity of the Keys
We have shown that a exists for each (R s 1 , R m 1 , R s 2 ,  R m 2 , . . . , R s t , R m t ) tuple that satisfies (1)-(3), such that both the regular decoders and the virtual decoder are successful, and P e → 0. Now, we show that such codes also meet the requirements of zero-leakage and uniformity of the keys in Definition 2. First, we derive the following inequality,
In (a) we used the fact that the secrets and helper data directly follow from the observation vectors. In (b) we used Fano's inequality for the virtual decoder to derive an upper bound for H (X 1 X 2 . . . 
. . S t M t ). And in (c)
In (a) we used
, which follows from the chosen secret and helper data rates. And in (b) we used Fano's inequality for the virtual decoder as before. Thus for n large enough,
. . M t ) ≤ δ for any δ > 0, which satisfies the leakage requirement.
E. Conclusion
From (2) and (3), we conclude that the achievable secretkey rates are
It directly follows that the secret-key capacity C t i = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X i ; X t +1 ), and the sum-capacity C t
VI. CONVERSE PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
We prove that no secret-key rate tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R t ) is achievable that lies outside of the secret-key capacity region C (t ) of Theorem 2. Achievability is defined as in Definition 2.
We derive an upper bound for the joint entropy of the first i keys (for any i ∈ 1, 2, . . . t),
For the first inequality (a), we use Fano's inequality for the decoders
In (b) we use the leakage (last) requirement of Definition 2, and furthermore we use the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. In (c) we use again the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and that the secrets and helper data directly follow from the observation vectors x 1 and
The upper bounds for the entropy of the keys, together with the definition of the secret-key rates and the uniformity condition in Definition 2, result in the following inequalities
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}. Now with δ ↓ 0 and n → ∞, we obtain the upper bounds for the achievable rates as given in Theorem 2. VII. KEY-REPLACEMENT In the multiple enrollment setting, an additional key is generated during each consecutive enrollment. Until now, we have required that all the generated keys are independent. Now, we introduce a variation on the original scheme where each new key is not (necessarily) independent of the previous keys. We say that the new key replaces the previous keys and we call this new setting the multiple-enrollment setting with key-replacement. Since the new key replaces the old key, each decoder will only reconstruct the most recent key.
In the t-enrollment setting with key-replacement, t consecutive enrollments are performed, see Figure 4 . During enrollment i a secret s i and helper data m i are generated, based on an observation x i . A decoder that observes x t +1 can decode the most recent secret s i as long as it has received all helper data up to this point, (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i ) . We assume that the helper data are public, and therefore they should not reveal any information about the keys to an attacker, who cannot observe the SRAM-PUF. Finally, all secret keys must be uniformly distributed.
. . , m i ) of an observation vector and i (previous) helper data. We are now interested in the achievable secret-key rate tuples for any number t of enrollments, where we assume that the rates are non-negative and achievability is defined as follows. , R 2 , . . . , R t ) such that
The secret-key capacity C
In the next Sections, we first prove that all rate tuples that are inside the secret-key capacity region C (t ) rep are achievable. Furthermore, we prove the converse of Theorem 3, that is, no rate tuples are achievable that are outside of the capacityregion C (t ) rep .
VIII. ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The achievability proof for the t-enrollment setting with key-replacement is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Therefore, we focus on the differences here. In contrast to Section V, we now need to proof uniformity and zero-leakage for each secret key separately. Therefore, we change the definition of the virtual decoders and we require t virtual decoders instead of one. Furthermore, the zero-leakage proof is a bit more involved than before.
We use (2 n R s 1 , 2 n R m 1 , 2 n R s 2 , 2 n R m 2 , . . . , 2 n R s t , 2 n R m t , n)-codes for the t-enrollment setting with key-replacement as defined in Section VII. As before, we define t regular decoders that reconstruct secret keys from the received helper data and one observation of the SRAM values. Furthermore, we define t virtual decoders to help us show that the secrets are uniform and that there is no leakage.
A. Regular Decoders
As in Section V, each regular decoder D i can reconstruct observation vector x i using joint typicality decoding with all previous helper data (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i ) and an observation vector x t +1 . The corresponding secret s i follows from the encoding function E i . We set again
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}.
B. Virtual Decoders
The t virtual decoders operate slightly different from the single virtual decoder in Section V. The i th virtual decoder reconstructs the observation vector tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i ) from all previous helper data (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i ) and the current secret key s i (instead of all previous keys).
First, he finds the unique
We can use a random binning argument (see Slepian-Wolf Theorem) to show that codes exist such that decoding of x i is successful with high probability when the labelings of the encoding functions have rates such that,
Therefore, we choose
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} and where (a) follows from the permutation symmetry. Then, the virtual decoder reconstructs all previous observations ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i−1 ) using the same strategy as the regular decoders. That is, he uses joint typicality decoding with all previous helper data and the observation vector x i . If the regular decoders are successful, then this decoding step is also successful.
C. Zero-Leakage and Uniformity of the Keys
We have shown that codes exist for each (R s 1 , R m 1 , R s 2 , R m 2 , . . . , R s t , R m t ) tuple that satisfies both (6) and (7), such that both the regular decoders and the virtual decoders are successful. That is, for these codes the error probability P e goes to zero for large n. Now, we show that these codes also meet the requirements of zero-leakage and uniformity of the keys in Definition 3.
We can use similar derivations as in Section V to show
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . t}. Where we now used Fano's inequality for the i th virtual decoder to give us an upper bound for
for n large enough. Furthermore, by the choice of the secret-key rates, we have
Thus the uniformity conditions of the secret keys in Definition 3 hold.
The resulting leakage about a secret s i from helper data
In (a) we used 
D. Conclusion
From (7) we conclude that the achievable secret-key rates for the t-enrollments setting with key-replacement are
It directly follows that the secret-key capacity
IX. CONVERSE PROOF FOR THEOREM 3
We prove that no secret-key rate tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R t ) is achievable that lies outside of the secret-key capacity region C (t ) rep of Theorem 3. Achievability is defined as in Definition 3. We can use similar steps as in Section VI to find the following upper bound for the entropy of the i th key (for any i ∈ 1, 2, . . . t),
The upper bounds for the entropy of the keys, together with the definition of the secret-key rates and the uniformity condition in Definition 3, result in the following inequalities
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}. Now with δ ↓ 0 and n → ∞, we obtain the upper bounds for the achievable rates as given in Theorem 3.
X. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this paper we consecutively generate multiple keys based on multiple observations of the same SRAM-PUF. In the following we first analyze the secret-key capacity region that we found for the regular setting and then for the setting with key replacement. Finally, we discuss the properties of the schemes with respect to practical applications.
A. Secret-Key Capacity Region for Multiple Enrollment Setting
We have defined the multiple enrollment scheme in Section IV and we have derived the corresponding secretkey capacity region. The secret-key capacity region C (3) for the multiple enrollment setting with t = 3 enrollments is visualized in Figure 5 . Any triplet of secret-key rates that corresponds to a point on or below the red surface is inside the capacity region.
First of all, we are interested in the total achievable secretkey rate for this scheme. Since the keys are independent and uniformly distributed, we can consider a total key that is the concatenation of all the generated keys. This total key is uniformly distributed and has a secret-key rate equal to the sum of the rates, R t total = t i=1 R i . Therefore, the maximum achievable total key rate is equal to the sum-capacity C t sum defined in Definition 2. It follows from Theorem 2, that the total capacity is C t sum = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X t ; X t +1 ). We conclude that the total capacity in general increases with each additional enrollment. The magnitude of the increase depends on the statistics of the source. We have calculated the values of the sum-capacity for an empirical statistical model of SRAM-PUF and visualized the result in Figure. 6. Clearly, all rate tuples that have t i=1 R i = C t sum achieve the total capacity. For t = 3 enrollments, this corresponds to all secret-key rate triplets that lie on the red surface in Figure 5 .
Secondly, we are interested in the maximum achievable rate for the i th key, or the secret-key capacity C t i . It follows from Theorem 2, that C t i = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X i ; X t +1 ). Furthermore, secret-key capacity for the i th key can only be achieved if all preceding keys have rate zero, that is R j = 0, ∀ j < i . For example, for t = 3, secret-key capacity for the second key is achieved by all rate-triplets that lie on the edge of the capacity region marked by the squares (connecting the points (0, I (X 1 X 2 ; X 4 ), I (X 3 ; X 4 |X 1 X 2 )) and (0, I (X 1 X 2 ; X 4 ), 0)) in Figure 5 .
B. Secret-Key Capacity Region for Multiple Enrollment Setting With Key-Replacement
We have defined the multiple enrollment scheme with keyreplacement in Section VII and we have derived the corresponding secret-key capacity region. The secret-key capacity region C (3) rep for t = 3 enrollments is visualized in Figure 5 . Any triplet of secret-key rates that corresponds to a point on or below the blue surface is inside the capacity region. We can immediately see that the secret-key capacity region for the multiple enrollment setting with key replacement includes the capacity region for the regular setting. Therefore, more rate tuples are achievable in this case. However, what can we say about the total achievable secret-key rate, and the secret-key capacity?
First of all, we are interested in the total achievable secretkey rate for this scheme. Since all previous keys are replaced by the most recent key, the total rate at any time is equal to the rate of the last key, so R t rep,total = R t . Note that it does not make sense to concatenate the keys (as we did for the regular setting), since the keys are not independent here. Now, the maximum achievable total key rate is equal to the secret-key capacity of the last key, and it follows from Theorem 3, that the total capacity is C t rep,t = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X t ; X t +1 ). Note that this is equal to the total capacity for the regular setting. Clearly, all rate tuples that have R t = C t rep,t achieve the total capacity. For t = 3 enrollments, this corresponds to all secret-key rate triplets that lie on the blue surface in Figure 5 .
Second, we are interested in the maximum achievable rate for the i th key, or the secret-key capacity C t rep,i . It follows from Theorem 3, that C t rep,i = I (X 1 X 2 . . . X i ; X t +1 ). In contrast to the regular scheme, the i th key can have the maximum rate, independent of the values of the rates of the preceding keys. For example, in Figure 5 , all ratetriplets that lie on the face of the blue cube that is marked with triangles (with vertices (I (
, and (I (X 1 ; X 4 ), I (X 1 X 2 ; X 4 ), I (X 1 X 2 X 3 ; X 4 ))) achieve secretkey capacity for the second key.
C. Multiple Enrollment Scheme for Practical Applications
The multiple enrollment scheme may be used in practice to consecutively increase the secret-key rate of a system when more observations of the SRAM-PUF become available over time. Depending on the application, the encoder may generate an additional (independent) key, or may replace a previous key by a newly generated key. We have shown that for both scenario's the achievable rate of uniform (independent) key-material is equal to the mutual information between the observations at the encoders and a single observation at the decoder, I (X 1 X 2 . . . , X t ; X t +1 ).
In the following, we first calculate the corresponding values for a statistical model of SRAM-PUF from the literature [10] . Then, we discuss two properties of the schemes that may be of interest for practical applications. Finally, we comment on our results for scenario's in which the permutation symmetry assumption may be invalid, and we discuss possible application of the multiple enrollment scheme in authentication protocols.
1) Secret-Key Capacity Values:
We have seen that both versions of the multiple enrollment scheme can achieve the same total secret-key capacity. But what are typical values of the secret-key capacity? In [10] a statistical model for SRAM-PUF was presented and it was shown that the statistics match closely to the empiricial data. We use this model with the parameters (λ 1 = 0.065, λ 2 = 0.0), as found in [25] , to calculate the secret-key capacity after t enrollments, see the resulting plot in Figure 6 . After a single enrollment we find I (X 1 ; X t +1 ) = 0.811 bit and after 5-enrollments I (X 1 X 2 . . . X 5 ; X t +1 ) = 0.902 bit (an increase of 11%) and after 25-enrollments I (X 1 X 2 . . . X 25 ; X t +1 ) = 0.927 bit (an increase of 14%).
It is also visualized in the plot that the capacity approaches an upper bound. This can be easily explained using the statistical model for SRAM-PUF as presented in Section II. Each SRAM-cell has a hidden state variable θ that defines the one-probability of that cell. We can now find the following limit for the achievable secret-key rate C ∞ = I (X 1 X 2 . . . ; X t +1 ) = H (X t +1 ) − H (X t +1 |X 1 X 2 . . . ) (a) = H (X t +1 ) − H (X t +1 |X 1 X 2 . . . ) (b) = H (X t +1 ) − H (X t +1 |) = I (X t +1 ; ).
Here follows by the Markov chain X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ↔ ↔ X t +1 . For the parameters found in [25] this upper bound is calculated to be 0.933.
2) Revealing a Subset of the Keys: For the regular multiple enrollment scheme, we require the secret keys to be independent. As a result, all remaining keys remain secure even if a subset of the keys (together with the helper data) is revealed. Therefore, we can share the keys with different parties, and for example use each key to enroll in a different system. Any party that has access to a subset of the keys cannot obtain any information about the other keys, even when he has access to the corresponding helper-data.
The above property does not hold for the multiple enrollment setting with key-replacement, since the keys are not independent in this case.
3) Autonomous Encoders: In both the regular and the keyreplacement scenario the encoders do not require information about the previous enrollments to construct the current key and corresponding helper data. Therefore, each encoder operates autonomously.
4) Permutation Symmetry Assumption:
We note that in practice an SRAM-PUF may change its statistical behavior over time. This may for example be the result of temperature or voltage changes, or the result of aging effects. In such cases we need a more accurate model that takes the timedependent effects into account. We can then use similar techniques to the current work in order to derive secret-key capacity regions. However, the results will be different (and time-dependent), since the permutation symmetry assumption cannot be used to simplify the equations. This also results in more complicated derivations, and makes it hard (if not impossible) to generalize to any number t of enrollments.
5) Authentication Protocols, Attacks: Our multiple enrollment scheme may be used to develop new authentication protocols for IoT (Internet of Things) devices. Lightweight authentication protocols based on PUFs are e.g. described in [32] (for RFID) and [33] (for IoT). It follows from our results that our keys are secure against any attack, as long as only the helper data is revealed to an attacker. Therefore, any protocol that would embed a multiple enrollment scheme should ensure that no information is revealed about the observation vectors or the keys.
XI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We have analyzed the achievable secret-key rates in multiple enrollment systems. During each consecutive enrollment an additional observation of the source is used to generate an additional key and corresponding helper data. Two scenarios are analyzed, a regular setting where each additional key is independent of previously generated keys, and the keyreplacement setting where the previous key is replaced by a new key of increased rate. Our results show that codes exist for which consecutively increase the key rate after each enrollment. As future work we want to design codes that can achieve the derived secret-key rates.
